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Abstract. There is an ongoing right-wing populist revolution in Western democratic 
societies. Revolution is by definition a period of upheaval. The premise of this paper is 
that the right-wing populist regimes try to find a level of stability by doubling down on 
the antiestablishment resentment, authoritarianism and nativism which characterize 
them. This is achieved through the manipulation of collective identity and collective 
memory. The present paper analyses the manner in which populist politics are 
validated, maintained and reinforced by modifying collective memory. For the purpose 
of this paper, collective memory will be considered as a group identity narrative, a 
consensual convention which allows for the integration of recalled events in a manner 
consistent with it and the rejection of events not consistent with it. The increased 
emphasis on nationalism affects both collective identity and collective memory, leading 
to the repositioning of the Overton window and causing the re-emergence of previously 
unacceptable antisemitic attitudes. The present revival of antisemitism is seen as the 
necessary consequence of the changes caused by the shift toward right-wing populism 
and authoritarianism. 




Individual Identity, Group Identity and Collective Memory 
 
We are in the midst of a rightist populist surge in most of the 
Western democracies. The causes include perceived threats to national 
and cultural identity, national independence, a weakening of the 
concept of nation state with its “inviolable borders” and a general 
dissatisfaction accompanied by a feeling of being wronged and losing 




small group level, the social trends named above are mediated and 
integrated by using the constructs of collective identity and collective 
memory. This is the perspective of the present paper, which continues 
my efforts to propose a framework integrating the individual, small 
group and societal levels. In previous papers I tried to explore the 
neuropsychology, evolutionary psychology and dynamic psychology 
connections of processes such as antisemitism, group identity and 
collective memory. The reason is my abiding belief that an explanation 
of these processes has to be consistent both within each level and across 
levels, and the present paper continues this perspective.  
Mudde (2013) has identified three essential characteristics shared 
by all populist philosophies: anti-establishment animus, authoritarianism 
and nativism. Those are the necessary components; specific populist 
movements may differ in many other respects. This tendency can be 
traced back, at least in part, to the decreasing attachment to democratic 
values, as demonstrated by the work of Foa and Mounk (2016): the 
fundamental beliefs regarding the importance of democratic values are 
weakening all over Europe and in the US. 
In fact, democracies seem to decay toward one of two solutions: 
“illiberal democracy” in which the will of the majority loosely 
determines public policy but individual rights are regularly violated (as 
for instance in Hungary) or “undemocratic liberalism” in which 
individual rights are respected but the mechanism for translating the 
will of the people into public policy has broken down (as for instance in 
those European countries where the majority opposition to admitting 
new refugees is overlooked.) Populism naturally fills the void left by the 
weakening commitment to democratic values. 
Barber (1996) has described two “axial principles” of our age: 
tribalism and globalism, two forces in conflict he named “McWorld” 
and “Jihad”. The former represents a centripetal force for transnational 
and cross-cultural homogenization and integration, and tends to occur 
more in open societies while the latter is a centrifugal force for 
fragmentation, separatism and tribalism, occurring more often in closed 
societies, often based on national or religious identity.  
If Foa and Mounk’s suppositions are correct, in rich countries the 
increased tendency to fragmentation, isolationism and tribalism results 
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in a shift from “Undemocratic Liberalism” toward “Illiberal Democracy,” 
which then further decays into authoritarianism. When one adds the strong 
nationalist component, the resulting trend is toward right-wing populism. 
 Redfield (1953) identified two of the essential dichotomies by 
which we structure our world: “Me/Non Me” and “We/They.” The 
individual sense of identity is the decision criterion for the first 
dichotomy. Group identity is the criterion for the second one. 
We evolved in small groups of hunter-gatherers and sociality 
(Wilson, 2012) is the key of our evolutionary success. The necessary 
social cohesion within the group was enhanced by the emergence of a 
common frame of reference. The development of language allowed the 
sharing of mental imagery, which in turn led to the emergence of 
storytelling and to the invention of myths of creation. The myths played 
an essential role in structuring the universe into realms, (this world and 
the spirit world, this realm and the one beyond) and in the emergence of 
ideas about transcendence, mortality and immortality.   
The different aspects of reality were integrated by incorporation in 
the same overarching universe of meaning, which Berger and Luckman 
(1966) named the symbolic universe. 
The evolutionary role of the formation of symbolic universes is to 
enhance group cohesion. Together with the development of cortical 
structures in the frontal cortex which control and regulate social behavior, 
proto-morality – a set of rules promoting the altruistic behaviors which 
foster group survival – is being internalized by the members of the group. 
The emergence of collective identity is a consequence of belonging to the 
same symbolic universe. Collective memory is at the group level what the 
narrative of the self is at individual level. 
According to Erikson (1994), identity is a state of self-sameness and 
continuity, integrated both longitudinally (historically) over the life 
cycle, and horizontally across situations. Identity is internally consistent, 
and it is validated through interactions with others. It provides the point 
of view of the “I”, the perspective from which we observe the world. 
The sense of identity is present in all our activities, it is the basis on 
which we decide the relevance of all our experiences, and information 
related to it is embedded in all our memories. The sense of self is our 




influence over all our conscious decisions, yet an overwhelming 
proportion of it is taking place outside our awareness. We are not aware 
of how and when the sense of identity is generated or of how the sense 
of self is maintained. 
One of the paradoxes of individual identity is that it is an 
integrated conglomerate of a multitude of shared collective identities. 
This quality is similar to recursiveness in linguistics: one can identify as 
a Romanian of Greek Orthodox religious affiliation, who is 
Transylvanian, living in Bucharest, speaker of French, a theater lover, 
who is a fan of a given soccer team and loves red wine etc. Collective 
memory also has a kaleidoscopic quality: depending on the situation, 
any of these collective identities may be perceived as the salient one. As 
Todorov writes, “individual identity stems from the encounter of 
multiple collective identities within one and the same person; each of 
our various affiliations contributes to the formation of the unique 
creature that we are. Human beings are not all similar, or entirely 
different; they are all plural within themselves, and share their 
constitutive traits with very varied groups, combining them in an 
individual way. Individual identity results from the interweaving of 
several collective identities.” (2010, p. 21) I believe that Todorov is 
correct and that he described an intrapsychic structure with a very 
special property: the individual and social elements are so intertwined 
that it is impossible to separate them. This is like Freud’s “complex 
concatenation,” which indicates a superposition of different levels of 
motivation or interpretations of reality, or to Lacan’s signifying chain: 
"links by which a necklace firmly hooks onto a link of another necklace 
made of links" (2002, p. 145).  The role of this type of structure is to 
provide the connection between the individual and group levels, and to 
ensure its continuity. We can find this type of structure in individual 
and collective identity, in collective memory and in morality. At the 
individual level, collective identity, be it group, ethnic, religious, 
ideological or national (or combinations of the above) is part of 
individual identity. Conversely, at the group level, collective identity is 
a conglomerate of individual identities. As the individual matures, the 
individual and social components become more interwoven. Different 
components become salient depending on the situation. 
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The maintenance of identity be it individual or collective can be 
described as a flow: the evaluation process is continuous and iterative; 
with the result at moment “n” becoming a component of the input for 
the evaluation at moment “n + 1” when a new situation warrants it. In 
effect, whenever an individual or group is confronted with a new event, 
a decision has to be made as to whether to incorporate it in the narrative.  
 
 
Fig. 1. Decisions involved in the maintenance of identity 
  
Collective identity, be it group, ethnic, religious, ideological or 
national (or combinations of the above) is part of individual identity. 
The social factors involved in defining the moral norms and in creating 
and maintaining the individual identity provide the linkage mechanisms 
between individual and collective identities. Morality, by definition, 
shapes interpersonal behavior, first by creating an internalized moral 
code that is culturally defined, and second by providing the basis for 
supervision and feedback by others in the community. In turn, the 
norms and values shared by the community shape the public sphere and 
determine which topics can be discussed within it.  
Todorov (2004) described collective memory as “not a memory per 
se, but a discourse that takes place in the public sphere, which reflects 
the self-image that a society or a group within the society tries to 
project” (author’s translation, p. 41). Collective memory is a consensual 
convention which allows for the integration of recalled events in a 




not consistent with it. The same cognitive distortion mechanisms are 
used at individual and collective levels. Taken together these strategies 
facilitate the construction of a false but coherent version of past events, 
which is then used to interpret and integrate present events.  
The integrity and consistency of individual identity are the 
validated by interaction with others. However, what constitutes a check 
on the validity of collective memory/group identity? If a fact affirmed by 
another group is seen positively, its integration in the collective memory 
is conflict free. However, if a fact liked by the group in question is 
contested by other groups, or a fact disliked by the group is affirmed by 
other groups, confrontation occurs because the challenge is constructed 
as a narcissistic injury, a threat to the group identity itself. Like in the 
case of individual identity, self-consistency is more important than 
objective reality, and the brain rewards you more for it. 
In the case of individual identity, information that is discrepant 
with the narrative of the self is repressed. Aside from validation by 
others and self-consistency, repression, guilt, and shame are the internal 
control mechanisms. In the case of collective memory repression takes the 
form of willful ignorance, “ignorance as an active construct” (Proctor, 2008, 
p. 85), ignorance “made, maintained and manipulated… (so) that certain 
people don’t want you to know certain things, or will actively work to 
organize doubt or uncertainty or misinformation to help maintain (your) 
ignorance. They know and may or may not want you to know they know.”  
The effect is the relegation of questionable issues outside the public sphere, 
so they cannot be debated. Discrepant information that challenges the 
conventional truth is met with anger and aggression.  
The public sphere is also influenced by the individual strategies 
needed to adapt to society, more so in the case of societies with a 
totalitarian past. Milgram’s obedience to authority, Janis’ groupthink, 
Lifton’s psychic numbing and doubling, Orwellian doublethink, Milosz’ 
ketman and self-deception are a few examples. The internal cohesion of 
the group is assured by self-censorship and those who are opposed to it 
are punished. Once the value system has been internalized, the 
individual becomes a de facto enforcer of conformity. 
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In turn this leads to the repositioning of the Overton window, 
which defines the range of acceptable behaviors in a given situation. The 




Fig. 2. The Overton Window 
 
In a previous work (Dan, 2017), I proposed the concept of a 
tri-dimensional Overton space, which allows for a better representation 
of the factors involved in repositioning the window. For example this is 
a representation of the Overton window for antisemitism. The degree of 
antisemitism increases along all the axes; the position of the window 






Fig. 3. antisemitism in Overton space 
 
I believe that populism is a process similar to a permanent 
revolution, and the states undergoing it are essentially unstable. As 
Dasgupta (2018) argues, the populist revolution does not stop with the 
restauration of the nation state, but causes continuing fragmentation and 
tribalization. The present-day leaders must avoid at all cost being 
perceived as “elite” and a force for status quo, and they try to amplify 
the nationalist and isolationist message in an effort to stay in power and 
achieve a degree of stability. In fact one could argue that the resurgence 
of antisemitism is the logical and unavoidable consequence of right 
wing populism. The characteristics of populism described by Mudde: 
authoritarianism, nativism and anti-elitism facilitate the adoption and 
dissemination of antisemitic ideas. Of the three axes the easiest to 
manipulate is collective memory. There are, in fact many mechanisms 
that enforce conformity with the collective memory of the group. The 
most general of those is what the citizens of Athens called “me 
mnesikakein,” an oath not to remember past wrongdoing. For a modern 
version see Spain’s “pacto de olividado” regarding the Civil War. 
Coman, Stone et al. (2014) have shown that trying to justify atrocities 
committed in war alters the memories of those who committed them. 
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Coman summarized the findings for Science daily: “What we learn from 
this research is that moral disengagement strategies are fundamentally 
altering our memories… More specifically, these strategies affect the 
degree to which our memories are influenced by the conversations we 
have with one another” (2014, p. 1). Coman, Momennejad et al (2016) 
also found that those sharing memories of an event tend to synchronize 
them. Since collective memory is shared, this means that it tends to 
become more and more self-consistent.  
Antisemitism can be considered a self-referential and self-
justifying group of axioms supported by memes which are integrated in 
larger belief systems such as religion or nationalism. The message being 
transmitted is the evil represented by the Jews.  This information gets 
converted into a moral principle. allowing the holder of antisemitic 
beliefs to be free of cognitive dissonance. 
Bering described a number of core antisemitic beliefs which can be 
considered memes: “Jews are bad by nature,” “The bad traits of the Jews 
are incorrigible,” “Jews must be seen as a group, not as individuals,” 
“Jews remain essentially alien,” “Jews bring disaster to their “host societies,” 
“Jews are secretive,” “Jews are part of a conspiracy.” (1992, p. 76) 
Please note that the above beliefs have been stripped of any 
religious connotation and can be passed on as folk wisdom under the 
heading “what everyone knows about the Jews.”    
Lifton (1983) coined the term “thought stopping cliché” to describe 
the use of commonly used phrases to defuse cognitive dissonance and 
quiet dissent: “The most far-reaching and complex of human problems 
are compressed into brief, highly reductive, definitive-sounding phrases, 
easily memorized and easily expressed. These become the start and 
finish of any ideological analysis,” (p. 173). What I am proposing is that 
the antisemitic memes are such “thought stopping clichés,” not subject 
to debate or analysis, easily reproduced and replicated, embedded in 
value systems that help to maintain them, dissimulate them and 
transmit them. The way in which they spread is similar to a computer 
virus: self-replicating, able to develop defenses and mutate, distorting 
the value systems that host them in order to accommodate and 
propagate themselves. They are easily assimilated into the collective 




in a resurgence of antisemitism. Once the collective memory is modified, 
it modifies the collective identity as well, creating a narrative of having 
been victimized by the actions of Jews. 
Gazzaniga (2010) has argued that our actions must make sense to 
ourselves. He posited the existence of a brain structure he named “the 
interpreter” whose function is to ensure that we understand our actions, 
which must also conform to the internalized behavior code. Similarly, at 
the group level, the actions taken have to be consistent with the group’s 
identity, collective memory, and shared morality. However, as Westen 
(2008) has demonstrated validation is by emotional congruence rather 
than cognitive consistency. The portrayal of Jews as an existential threat, 
and of host nation as a victim, activates the Contempt-Anger-Disgust 
system (Rozin et al, 1999) and morally sanctions violence against them, 
leading to the repositioning of the Overton window regarding actions 
that can be taken against Jews. 
 
 
Fig. 4. The repositioning of the Overton window 
 
The resurgence of antisemitism has led to a re-writing of different 
nations’ participation in the Holocaust and the reinterpretation of the 
respective nation’s fascist past. Poland has recently adopted a law 
making the attribution of responsibility for or complicity during the 
Holocaust to the Polish nation or state a crime. This overlooks 
documented massacres such as Jedbawne or the work of Polish/ 
Canadian historian Grabowski (2013), which attributed to Poles 
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responsibility for the deaths of at least 200,000 Jews. Slovakia, Romania, 
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary are also actively involved in an 
effort to falsify their history. 
As affirmed earlier, rejection of a significant event by not including 
it in the collective memory is achieved through willful ignorance. This 
has the effect of excluding the subject from the dialogue taking place in 
the public sphere. The process though which certain topics become 
taboo is similar to the one through which censorship becomes self-
censorship, progressing from the silencing of public speech to exclusion 
from the collective memory. For example, the discussion of the 
Romanian role in the Holocaust was made impossible because as the 
Final Report of the Wiesel Commission notes, the official and definitive 
communist version of history, Roller’s “History of Romania”, replaced 
Jews and Roma… with communists and Romanians, as the main victims 
of fascism and ignored antisemitism as a defining trait of Antonescu’s 
dictatorship” (p.8). The official Romanian strategy in the communist and 
post-communist periods alike has been described by the Wiesel 
Commission (2005) as “selective negationism”; not a denial of the 
Holocaust per se, but a denial that Romania had a role in it. Shafir (2002) 
has identified several types of negationism used by countries which 
have participated in the Holocaust and try to deflect the guilt without 
denying the Holocaust outright. 
The role played by the fascist Iron Guard movement (the 
Legionnaires) is also subject to revisionism and negationism. More 
recently, the controversy surrounding the adoption of Law no. 217/2015 
 (“for the modification and completion of Emergency Governmental 
Ordinance no, 31/2002 regarding the banning of organizations and 
symbols with fascist, racist or xenophobic character and the promotion 
of the cult of persons guilty of crimes against peace and mankind") 
commonly referred to as the “anti-Legionnaire law” has laid bare the 
essence of the conflict: Present day right wing sympathizers feel that the 
law punishes “anti-communist fighters” and insist that a similar law 
banning the denial of the crimes and the promotion of the symbols of 
communism be promulgated. Furthermore, they insist that the same law 
should prohibit the negation of Holocaust and the negation of the crimes 




movement. What lies behind this reaction is the effort to draw a false 
moral equivalency between the Holocaust and the crimes of 
communism, trying to use the latter to justify the Holocaust post hoc by 
emphasizing the role of Jews in the communist nomenclature. The fight 
around this issue has a ritualistic aspect: A significant figure of the Iron 
Guard movement is being honored; the Wiesel Institute protests, an 
attempt at whitewashing the record follows, and a protracted conflict 
ensues. This pattern is by no means limited to Romania. In Croatia the 
appointment of cabinet minister Hasabegovic, a known denier of the 
atrocities committed by the “Ustasha” regime during WWII, has 
provoked a protest by the Simon Wiesenthal Institute. In neighboring 
Hungary the controversy regarding the erecting of a bust of noted 
antisemite Balint Homan in Székesfehérvár followed a similar trajectory 
and it took an intervention of the US to stop it. (“It’s why, when a statue 
of an antisemitic leader from World War II was planned in Hungary, we 
led the charge to convince their government to reverse course… This 
was not a side note to our relations with Hungary, this was central to 
maintaining a good relationship with the United States, and we let them 
know,” President Obama, in a speech at the Israeli embassy on 
Holocaust Remembrance Day, January 27, 2016). This was followed by 
an almost identical incident in Budapest regarding the unveiling of the 
bust of Gyorgy Donat, another antisemitic politician.  
The same conflict is also fought under different disguises: 
criticizing the pro Iron Guard “golden generation” of intellectuals, 
criticizing “the memory of Mircea Eliade, Emil Cioran, Mircea 
Vulcanescu, Vintila Horia, Nechifor Crainic or Mihai Manoilescu is 
considered a sacrilege, a crime of lese-majeste. From that moment on 
public dialogue is impossible” (Florian, 2018, p. 179). The Romanian 
right is also involved in a massive public relations action aimed at 
rehabilitating Marshall Antonescu. As Cazan (2018) demonstrates, the 
majority of prominent Romanian historians either support this effort or 
are equivocating. At the same time narratives that run counter to the 
rightist trend are attacked as being anti-Romanian. 
Examples include the reaction to the book of Manu and 
Buzdughina, which disproved the claim that virulent antisemite and 
Iron Guard ideologue Nicolae Paulescu was “robbed” of the Nobel prize 
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for medicine, the reaction to Radu Ioanid’s book and interviews about 
the Romanian participation in the Holocaust, the reaction to the work of 
Adrian Cioflanca, which uncovers new evidence of mass killings of Jews 
perpetrated by Romanian troops during WWII, or the reaction to Florin 
Iepan’s documentary regarding the atrocities committed by the 
Romanian troops in Odessa and Radu Jude’s film “The dead country.” 
Each of the above was labeled “anti-Romanian” because they challenged 
the conventional wisdom and punctured sacred cows, challenging the 
collective memory narrative. Norman Manea’s (1994) essay “Felix Culpa” 
regarding Eliade’s lack of public repentance about his support for the 
Iron Guard was met with sharp criticism from the intellectuals of “the 
new Romanian right” and with antisemitic slurs and thinly veiled threats. 
In Hungary, the obsession with George Soros’ influence has 
reached levels of paranoia which seem to come right out of George 
Orwell’s 1984. The Orban government uses Soros as a straw man, a 
stand in for the world-wide Jewish conspiracy, and by extension, an 
excuse for its raw antisemitism. It also uses the Soros connection to 
attack the Central European University, a rare beacon of freedom in an 
increasingly authoritarian Hungary. As Mudde (2017) has noted, 
Orban’s provocations may force the European Union to finally take 
action. As it stands, the infection is spreading and other countries, for 










Fig. 6. Poster combining Soros as a puppeteer with a Nazi antisemitic poster 
 
I would be remiss if I did not mention that in England, after right 
wing populist movement led to Brexit, there was an explosion of 
antisemitism in the left leaning Labor party. The de-facto leader, Jeremy 
Corbin, as well as Labor members of the House of Commons made 
blatantly antisemitic statements, thinly disguised as criticisms of Israel, 
followed by utterly unconvincing apologies. This only proves that the 
disinhibition of racist, xenophobic and nationalistic attitudes brought 
forth by populism find fertile ground in both left leaning and right 
leaning ideologies.  
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